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5.2.1 Introduction, Context, and Goals
Introduction
Transportation is the largest GHG-emitting sector in the U.S., accounting for 28 percent of 
total emissions (See Figure 5.2.1).1 Reducing emissions in this sector is therefore critical 
in order to achieve the pathways to zero carbon laid out in Chapter 2. Thus, the focus of 
this chapter is on-road vehicle transportation (cars, buses, trucks) and domestic aviation. 
These sources contribute 93 percent of transportation-sector emissions in the United 
States.2 Rail (2 percent), water-borne transport (2 percent), pipeline (2 percent), and off-
road vehicles (<1 percent) will be addressed lightly. International aviation and maritime 
will not be directly addressed, nor will upstream emissions from producing energy, 
manufacturing vehicles, and transportation road infrastructure. All of these additional 
sources of GHG emissions are important, and merit study and policy attention, but are 
beyond the scope of this chapter.
The most compelling strategy for deep GHG emissions reductions, elaborated upon in 
this chapter, is to electrify surface vehicles: to switch vehicles from fossil fuel combustion 
(e.g., gasoline and diesel) to electric propulsion (e.g., battery, plug-in hybrid, and fuel cell 
electric vehicles). California has set aggressive sales targets for zero-emission vehicles, 
including a new executive order on September 23, 2020 to reach 100 percent of light-
duty sales by 2035, along with a recent rule requiring up to 75 percent of truck sales by 
that date. The cost of transitioning to electric propulsion is not expected to be great. A 
comparison of recent studies of a rapid transition to an electric-vehicle dominated car and 
truck system in California estimated $7 billion between 2020 and 2030 in additional cost for 
vehicles, energy systems, and refueling/recharging infrastructure due to declining costs.3 
This equates to less than 1 percent of the costs residents of the state would otherwise be 
paying over those years for gasoline and diesel vehicles and fuels. Approximately after 
2030, with this rapid transition, there would be no additional costs. Indeed, the savings to 
consumers would steadily increase—on a total cost of ownership basis—as a result of the 
lower energy and maintenance costs more than offsetting the higher (but diminishing) 
purchase cost of the vehicles. With this affordability in mind, in the near term, policies 
are needed to accelerate fuel efficiency in the gasoline and diesel fleets. Parallel and 
increasingly important is to accompany vehicle electrification strategies with policies to 
expand the production of low-carbon hydrogen and sustainable, low-carbon biofuels.
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Figure 5.2.1. Change in GHG emissions by source: 1990-2018 (U.S. EPA, 2015).
The second most compelling strategy is reduction in vehicle use—while enhancing 
accessibility to health, education, jobs, and other services for the mobility disadvantaged. 
In recent years, vehicle use per capita has been increasing—heightening the need to 
address vehicle use. Even if most vehicles were powered by electricity and renewable 
hydrogen, significant GHG emissions would be emitted in vehicle manufacturing and 
building and maintaining roads. The justification for reducing vehicle use is heightened 
by the large economic, health, land use, and social equity co-benefits. Strong policies 
and strategies are needed to alter the travel behavior of Americans; most, but not all of 
these policies are the prerogative of state, regional, and local governments. The Federal 
Government does retain a very important role, though. Through legislation and funding, 
it can empower and support state and local efforts to reduce single-occupant vehicle 
use and increase the use of less carbon-intense mobility. Federal and state policies can 
award more funding for low-carbon infrastructure, low-carbon modes of travel, pooled 
and shared private mobility services, and alter fuel and vehicle taxation practices. These 
federal policies could assure that most automated vehicles in urban areas are used to carry 
multiple riders (not zero or one occupants), impose pricing on interstate highways to favor 
pooled (and electric) vehicles, and support local governments adopting zero-emission 
zones. A diversity of policies will be needed; the path forward will be at times uneven due 
to the dramatic variation across states and urban, suburban, and rural communities.
What this chapter does not address is: 1) upstream emissions for producing vehicle 
energy (e.g., in oil refineries, electricity generation facilities, bio-refineries, and hydrogen 
production plants); and 2) manufacturing of vehicles and batteries, and manufacturing 
and building infrastructure, including roads, ports, and other terminals.4 These 
manufacturing and upstream emissions are considerable; with today’s gasoline cars, 
manufacturing emissions are less than 10 percent of total emissions, but for battery 
electric vehicles they account for about 40 percent of total emissions (in part because there 
are no tailpipe emissions and upstream emissions are relatively small), and could amount 
to as much as two-thirds of a future battery electric vehicle (BEV) operated on a primarily 
renewable grid.5 Upstream emissions of oil production amount to another 20 percent 
(and increasing) of vehicle energy use, and emissions associated with the manufacture of 
cement and concrete for roads adding another few percent. Both direct energy emissions 
as well as upstream and manufacturing emissions would be reduced if the carbon intensity 
of electricity were lowered, a necessary change detailed in the first section of this chapter. 
1905. APPROACHES FOR KEY SECTORS
In summary, the potential for large reductions in transportation emissions is achievable, 
but a diverse mix of strategies and policies will be needed. The most effective approach, 
given political realities, is a suite of policy instruments that address the production 
and use of vehicles and fuels, while providing enhanced mobility and accessibility to 
disadvantaged travelers. In other words, we must address the sale and use of the vast 
array of bicycles, scooters, cars, trucks, buses, ships, trains and planes, and reduce the 
carbon footprint of the energy and fuels that power them. A simple carbon tax could be 
effective, but most research suggests that to be successful it would need to be far higher 
than taxpayers and consumers would accept in order to accomplish significant emissions 
reduction.6 The behavior of a vast array of travelers, companies, and governments must 
be altered to achieve deep carbon reductions—which requires a diverse mix of regulations, 
investments, incentives, and education. 
We organize this chapter as follows: the social, economic, and equity implications of 
transportation investments and policy; overarching scenarios of deep decarbonization; 
and then strategies and policies to reduce car and truck use, the carbon intensity of car 
and truck technology, and jet travel, followed by conclusions and recommendations.
Societal Context and Goals
The U.S. transportation system is vital to the national economy and has major impacts on 
equity, access to jobs and services, and public health. In addition to travel by individuals, 
the U.S. transports a daily average of over $50 billion in freight.⁷ Across all levels of 
government, the U.S. spends approximately $300 billion annually on transportation 
infrastructure; still, major investments are needed to repair, maintain, and improve our 
network of transit, roads, waterways, rail, and aviation systems.⁸
Transportation emissions have been relatively flat in the past 15 years, the result of small 
reductions in emissions per vehicle (cars and trucks), largely offset by small increases in 
car and truck use (measured as vehicle miles traveled (VMT)). Total aviation emissions 
have increased slightly, with substantial increases in passenger airplane travel somewhat 
mitigated by small continuing improvements in aircraft efficiency as well as operational 
savings due to routing, take-offs, landings, and ground operations (see Figure 5.2.1). Deep 
decarbonization will therefore have an enormous impact, and will require reprioritizing 
transportation infrastructure investments to facilitate low-carbon mobility while growing 
jobs and our economy. 
The transportation system is also a major contributor to air pollution, which impacts 
public health. Policies to reduce transportation emissions that contribute to air pollution 
are largely under the jurisdiction of federal and state governments. As authorized by the 
Air Quality Act of 1967, the precursor to the Clean Air Act of 1970, car and truck emissions 
are regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency, with California allowed to 
set its own standards, including zero emission requirements, as long as they are more 
stringent. A later amendment to the Clean Air Act (1977) allowed other states to follow 
either the California or U.S. standards, although the Trump Administration’s 2019 attempt 
to withdraw California’s waiver, granting it authority to regulate GHGs, is being litigated. 
As of 2020, 9 other states have adopted California’s zero emission vehicle requirements 
and 13 states have adopted California’s GHG vehicle emission standards. These states, 
representing 30-40 percent of total light duty vehicle sales, accelerate emissions reduction, 
as well as the development and commercialization of advanced technology.
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With the transportation sector’s vast reach and impact, it is critical as we plan and 
implement pathways for deep decarbonization that we take the social and economic 
impacts of our regulatory policies into account such that transportation infrastructure 
investments maximize opportunities for co-benefits that are equitably shared. 
Economic Impact
The policies and investments described in this chapter are expected to come at a relatively 
small net monetary cost to society and can be designed to have a minimal net fiscal 
impact.⁹ Considerable additional resources will be needed during the early years of the 
transition to accelerate the introduction of low and zero-carbon vehicles and fuels. But 
most or perhaps all of these additional costs need not come from taxpayers. They can 
come as transfers between industries and companies, as in California where Chrysler 
buys zero emission vehicle credits from Tesla, and Chevron buys low-carbon fuel standard 
credits from electric utilities. Moreover, revenue generated from carbon pricing programs, 
such as carbon cap-and-trade, and fuel use fees, can be used to incentivize low-carbon 
transportation investments. Carbon pricing policies that have generated significant 
proceeds for low-carbon investments include California’s cap-and-trade program, which 
has generated over $11 billion in auction proceeds over the past decade for various clean 
transportation programs.¹⁰ In addition to direct carbon pricing and investment, other 
means of incentivizing electric vehicles include revenue neutral fee-bate programs, where 
high-carbon and less efficient vehicles pay a fee based on their emissions, and low-carbon 
vehicles (especially ZEVs) receive a rebate. 
The likelihood of electric vehicles eventually costing little or nothing additional to society 
is dependent on the continued drop in the cost of batteries and electric vehicles. In 2010, 
batteries cost around $1,000/kWh. Now, they are estimated to be around $150/kWh and 
are projected to drop below $100/kWh by 2025 or sooner.¹¹ With vehicle prices dropping 
and significantly lower operating costs, breakeven purchase prices compared to internal 
combustion engines (ICE) could be achieved before 2025 for many light duty vehicles. 
There are significant opportunities to expand domestic clean transportation 
manufacturing and technology production throughout the supply chain for vehicles and 
batteries, which can create significant job growth and economic activity. In assessing the 
economic impact of decarbonization pathways, it is important to also consider the indirect 
economic benefits of policies such as smart growth and sustainable community planning—
for example, transit investment and transit-oriented development patterns. These indirect 
economic benefits can increase incomes and housing values in local communities. 
A key consideration is how the costs and the benefits of the policies impact different 
groups of people—including between households of different income levels, social 
and racial demographics, geographies, and place types. Transportation policies and 
investments should be designed to account for these differences and enhance equity.
Equity and Public Health
An equitable transportation decarbonization pathway addresses the needs of individuals 
in communities underserved by the transportation system, as well as those overburdened 
by transportation pollution. 
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Decarbonization policies can lead to major improvements in public health through the 
reduction of co-pollutant emissions and the resulting air quality improvements. The 
transportation sector is responsible for over 50 percent of emissions from nitrogen 
oxides and a significant contributor of particulate matter and volatile organic compounds 
emissions, contributors to smog, respiratory ailments, cancer, and other health impacts.¹² 
The transition to zero-emission vehicles provides a critical opportunity to reduce these 
tailpipe pollutants. There are particularly impactful opportunities to reduce harmful air 
pollution through the electrification of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, including urban 
delivery trucks, transit fleets, school buses, and port equipment. 
Air pollution from transportation sources is concentrated in low-income communities 
and communities of color, often as a result of historical inequities and policy decisions, 
such as the siting of highways, ports, industrial facilities, airports, and bus depots. A just 
and equitable transportation decarbonization pathway will prioritize investments in these 
overburdened communities. National policies can build from state climate programs and 
frontline community leadership, such as enacted climate legislation in both California and 
New York that requires investments that benefit disadvantaged communities. In addition 
to requiring investment to benefit designated communities, each of these legislative 
frameworks prioritizes community engagement to inform and direct investments in zero 
emission transportation programs that best meet the needs of local populations.
Through strategic use of policy, low-income and other mobility-disadvantaged travelers 
can see significant improvements via expanded public transportation, more and cheaper 
pooled transportation network companies (TNC), and more and safer micro mobility 
options, such as shared bicycle and scooter services. It is important for decarbonization 
strategies to balance VMT reduction goals with the need to increase mobility and 
access for individuals and communities, including physically disadvantaged and elderly 
populations. Rethinking transportation planning to prioritize access to jobs and services 
(rather than speed of travel or other metrics) can create major decarbonization co-
benefits.
The transportation decarbonization pathway must also include low-carbon mobility 
opportunities for rural communities, including car-dependent low-income populations 
and an aging population. An increased variety of zero-emission vehicle offerings, 
including light-trucks and SUVs and models with longer range batteries, will have a 
significant impact. In addition to personal vehicle transportation, rural microtransit 
services, inter-city public transit route expansion, and increased availability of rural 
broadband internet and cellular data to promote telecommuting and telemedicine can 
provide additional benefits to rural populations and reduce the need to travel longer 
distances to obtain services.
COVID-19 response
In the era of COVID-19, investments in infrastructure, such as broadband, enable more 
access to services and economic activity through telecommunications. Transportation has 
been significantly affected by the pandemic, including dramatic decreases in public transit 
use and increases in telework. It remains to be seen how long-lasting these impacts will 
be. Transportation policymakers should design policies accordingly to enable continued 
access to jobs, healthcare, education, social interactions, and other critical services during 
and beyond the pandemic.
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COVID-19 has also brought increased attention to the impact of air pollution on 
cardiovascular and respiratory illness, including the racial and socio-economic disparities 
in how the pandemic is affecting communities and individuals across the U.S. A low-
carbon transportation future can have the important co-benefit of reducing air pollution, 
which exacerbates risk. 
Additionally, as we consider economic recovery and stimulus opportunities in the face of 
a recession and significant job losses, the nation should resist repeating the pattern where 
we expand capacity on our existing car-dependent system. The decarbonization pathway 
should include opportunities for investments in low-carbon transportation systems to 
stimulate job creation and economic development and provide alternative transportation 
options. These could include investments to enable smart growth, such as redevelopment 
in urban centers and mixed-use development in suburban settings; EV fast charging 
along highway corridors; expanded transit systems in high volume corridors; and rural 
broadband infrastructure. Low-carbon investments, such as upgraded transit systems, are 
often found to be more effective at long-term job creation and economic stimulus than 
traditional highway infrastructure projects.¹³
5.2.2 Scenarios and Overall Decarbonization Strategies 
Transportation can contribute to deep CO2 reductions in the 2050 time frame through a 
number of different decarbonization pathways. While achieving an 80 percent reduction 
in CO2 between 1990 and 2050 has been a common target, here we focus on achieving 
net-zero emissions (excluding manufacturing and upstream energy emissions) within 
the transportation sector by 2050 (see Figure 5.2.2) based on Chapter 2.  We consider the 
business-as-usual or reference scenario compared to the low-carbon central scenario with the 
results demonstrated in Table 5.2.1.¹⁴ These cases assume that the COVID-19 pandemic 
does not have any lingering effects beyond 2025.
Figure 5.2.2. Emissions from industries across scenarios (Chapter 2).
1945. APPROACHES FOR KEY SECTORS
Table 5.2.1: Assumptions and trends for low-carbon vehicles and fuels by scenario
Reference Scenario Central Scenario
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BAU Reference Scenario
We begin by considering a baseline or reference scenario, reflecting current trends 
and policies, but no new actions to lower CO₂ emissions further into the future. The 
penetration of low-carbon vehicles and fuels out to 2050 is small in this scenario. The 
policies undertaken to date spur some uptake but not enough to shift the energy use or CO₂ 
picture significantly. 
Central Scenario
Based on the Chapter 2 model, we consider a low-carbon central scenario of near-100 
percent reduction in domestic transportation GHG emissions by 2050 there is a strong 
uptake of zero emission light-duty vehicles with a somewhat slower, but still very 
ambitious, adoption of zero emission vehicles in the trucking sector. Furthermore, there 
is a reduction in passenger light-duty vehicle travel relative to the “reference” case. This is 
achieved from a mix of incentives and disincentives and shifts in transportation funding, 
resulting in more intensive use of existing modes (mostly light duty vehicles) and some 
shifting to other modes. We do not do a detailed tracking of these changes in travel but 
assume a net reduction of 15 percent.
There is an increase in the use of biofuels to replace liquid fossil fuels with advancements 
in the growth of all biofuels which are to be cellulosic-based, and some algae-based, post-
2030. Some electrofuels could also be used. In any case, these fuels would need to provide 
at least 80 percent well-to-wheels (life cycle) GHG reductions relative to gasoline or diesel 
fuel. By 2050, transportation-focused fuels such as gasoline and diesel are shown to be 
largely derived from biomass and (especially) hydrogen conversion in most scenarios apart 
from the reference. Hydrogen itself is derived from electrolysis and biomass in varying 
shares depending on the scenario.
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The impact of the electric vehicles on grid electricity demand in the central scenario is 
about a 20 percent increase to electricity demand above what would otherwise occur in 
2050. There are also liquid and gaseous fuels derived from electricity and used by the 
remaining internal combustion engine vehicles that add to electric demand. The final 
energy use in transportation in the central scenario is shown in Figure 5.2.3. Energy use 
drops by more than half to 2050, and electricity accounts for more than half of the energy 
in that year. Nearly all gasoline has been eliminated and diesel fuel use has been cut by 
about half.
Figure 5.2.3. Final Energy use by sector in the central scenario. (Chapter 2)
It may be possible to hit our overall energy and CO₂ targets for 2050 with slower rates of 
change than shown in this central case, especially in the early years. For example, a 50 
percent sales target for light-duty zero-emission vehicles in 2030 may be very challenging 
to achieve. A lower target such as 30 percent may be reasonable, as long as it is part of a 
trajectory to approach 100 percent shares by 2040.
5.2.3 Reducing Passenger Travel
Vehicle technology improvements, especially electrification, will dramatically reduce 
emissions (especially as renewable energy is used for electricity generation and hydrogen 
production), but substantial emissions will remain from vehicle manufacturing and 
upstream energy production. Reductions in the amount of vehicle-travel are central to 
meet GHG reduction goals. This is measured by VMT, representing how far each vehicle 
travels during a given time-period (e.g., a year). We posit a VMT reduction goal of 25 
percent per capita by 2050.
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Numerous policies can be enacted to reduce the use of single-occupant vehicles while 
simultaneously providing additional benefits to communities, including reduction in 
vehicle crashes, traffic noise, and criteria pollutants, while improving the livability of 
communities and improving accessibility to opportunities for all, especially disadvantaged 
communities. Different approaches are needed for different trip purposes and across 
urban, suburban, exurban, and rural areas.
VMT reductions will be challenging, but are key to achieving deep GHG reductions in 
transportation. These reductions can be achieved by 1) increasing the occupancy of 
passenger vehicles, 2) switching to low-carbon modes including active transportation, and 
3) replacing trips with telecommunications. Many of these VMT-reducing strategies and 
policies are under the jurisdiction of local governments, but there is also an important role 
for the Federal Government, as we highlight in this section.
In urban and some suburban areas, conventional bus and rail transit are compelling 
solutions if used intensively. They provide an alternative to driving and allow commuters 
to avoid traffic congestion, improve the economic productivity of transport infrastructure, 
and provide an important public service by providing access to those who are physically 
impaired and economically disadvantaged. Public transit accounts for a steadily dwindling 
share of passenger travel outside of major metropolitan areas. On average today’s 
buses have about the same GHG emissions per passenger mile as cars and light trucks, 
highlighting the need to fill these vehicles top capacity with passengers, electrify these 
modes, or convert to less carbon-intensive fuels. 
A principal strategy, to reduce VMT and GHG emissions while enhancing the public 
service benefits of conventional transit, is to focus buses (including Bus Rapid Transit) 
and rail lines on dense routes and urban centers—and increase their utilization. Land use 
changes are key to enhancing the economic and environmental performance of transit. 
Transit performs better when cities focus development around transit stations, increasing 
utilization and load factors. Various policies can encourage more compact, walkable, 
and transit-oriented development. These include easing local zoning regulations that 
restrict denser development and increasing incentives for retail and dense residential 
development near stations, and creating a more walkable environment so that more 
people can easily access bus and rail service. As part of any new or expanded transit 
project, funding incentives should be provided for municipalities to restructure their 
zoning to allow mixed use and transit-oriented development.
Making streets safer for pedestrians and cyclists will result in a reduction in motorized 
VMT and GHG emissions, by replacing vehicle trips and providing a feeder service to 
transit. Funding is clearly an issue, but investments and actions are also frequently 
hindered by local regulations. For example, even when communities desire safer streets, 
state Department of Transportations (DOTs) may require expensive studies that only 
examine the consequences on vehicular traffic flow. Any reduction in the automotive level-
of-service may be a roadblock to making a street safer for all users. Relaxing or replacing 
this arcane but influential policy is important. 
Perhaps the most important overarching strategy to reduce VMT is to expand mobility 
choices. New mobility options include bikeshare, e-bikes, e-scooters, demand-responsive 
transit (referred to as microtransit), and pooled ride-hailing (especially if automated). 
More choice means people are not dependent on their personal vehicles, encouraging 
them to own fewer cars. The result is greater use of low-carbon modes, less cost, more 
healthy living, less VMT, and less GHG emissions. In urban areas, this less car-centric 
transportation system provides higher quality service—less time and effort caring for 
vehicles, fewer parking hassles, and more free time as a result of being “chauffeured.” 
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Federal funding for bicycle, e-bicycle, and e-scooter lanes can lead to safer streets and 
increased use. These new technologies can also help to extend the reach of existing transit 
systems, making them more attractive, more efficient, and more equitable, and reduce 
carbon emissions.¹⁵ 
State and local governments make decisions on providing safe infrastructure but this 
can also be enabled by dedicated federal funding, such as through the Transportation 
Alternative set-aside program enabled under the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation 
(FAST) Act. Currently some states shift this money to traditional projects; this flexibility 
should be eliminated and the total funding available should be increased significantly.
Ride-hailing services, including companies such as Uber and Lyft and micro-transit 
providers such as Via, offer a new mobility option for many travelers. These provide a 
convenient door-to-door travel option for many trips; they are essentially a cheaper, more 
convenient taxi. They can serve as a complement to existing high-speed transit services 
by providing last-mile access and egress, and to replace low quality bus service in suburbs 
and small cities. In these settings, these services may be less expensive than conventional 
bus service and can provide higher quality service. A compelling strategy, for transit 
operators, ride-hailing companies, and travelers, is for these ride-hailing companies to 
partner with existing transit providers to provide affordable service in suburban, exurban, 
and rural areas, improving mobility and allowing transit agencies to invest in areas in need 
of higher capacity and more frequent service.
The promise of vehicle automation could provide greater mobility for many more people. 
While there was considerable buzz over the last half decade for automated vehicles, 
automotive and technology companies continue to invest in advancing the technology. It 
is widely believed that the first lucrative (on-road) application will be food delivery and 
automated taxis, sometimes referred to as robo-taxis. These robo-taxi services are still 
under development and while their debut is just beginning (Waymo began operating a 
sparse commercial service in Arizona in 2019) they build on a strategy of expanded choice; 
and if shared rides are common could lead to large reductions in VMT.
Another potentially important strategy for reducing VMT is the use of telecommunications 
to replace travel for work commutes, health services, long distance business trips, 
shopping and some social interactions. A substantial fraction of jobs can be performed 
from home, even if only on some days of the week. COVID-19 is demonstrating the 
feasibility and constraints of a home workforce. One of the constraints is inadequate 
broadband and hardware; policy can be aimed at increasing broadband connections and 
subsidizing hardware for homeworkers. Funding can be aimed at subsidizing broadband, 
especially in rural areas that may have inadequate coverage. Employer tax-credits for 
providing hardware to employees should be provided.
Likewise, online shopping has surged due to COVID-19, and can be more efficient than 
having people drive to shops. This trend can be facilitated by increased broadband. One 
downside is reducing the viability of small-scale retail which is one component of a mixed-
use neighborhood and transit-oriented development. These developments already have 
difficulty attracting a good mix of retail (partly due to competition from big-box stores but 
also from online retailers). Smaller scale retail in a mixed-use setting allows customers 
to walk or cycle to the store, or to drive shorter distances. One potential opportunity is to 
leverage online shopping by converting retail space to centralized delivery locations for 
customers to pick up products. This could increase the efficiency of online deliveries while 
maintaining mixed-use and transit-oriented developments.
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The Federal Government can play an instrumental role in reducing VMT and GHG 
emissions, while improving accessibility. Financial actions include altering the 
distribution of funds from the transportation trust fund and empowering and facilitating 
local and state actions. Most important is to shift funds, including those in stimulus 
packages, away from new highway capacity and lane expansions to support transit in 
dense areas, public-private partnerships between transit operators and ride-hailing 
providers, bicycle, pedestrian and e-scooter infrastructure, and transit-oriented 
development. The key mechanism for doing so is to link federal and state transportation 
funding to per capita VMT reductions. In this way, federal policy can be redesigned to 
encourage better planning at the local level—by providing funding and incentives to 
reduce VMT, support walkable and safer streets, and providing residents with alternative 
modes to avoid driving. 
Individually, many of these initiatives would result in small reductions in VMT and GHG. 
Collectively, they can add up to substantial per capita reductions in VMT and also result 
in substantial co-benefits of increased accessibility for mobility disadvantaged travelers, 
reductions in traffic crashes and fatalities, improved air quality, increased walking and 
physical activity, and an overall better quality of life. It could also result in less costly 
infrastructure and a more efficient overall transportation system.
5.2.4 Light Duty Vehicle Technology 
The overall strategy for decarbonizing light-duty vehicles (LDVs) is quite straightforward: 
electrify them all and use clean sources of power generation. Electric drivetrain vehicles 
(EVs), including battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and fuel cell vehicles, all offer large 
reductions in emissions with today’s grid as well as a pathway to net-zero as electricity is 
further decarbonized. Improved efficiency can reduce emissions, but in and of itself does 
not offer a pathway to net-zero given the overall constrained supply of low-carbon liquid 
fuels—in short, fossil-fuel powered vehicles are a technological dead end.
Full electrification of the LDV fleet is therefore both necessary and sufficient to 
decarbonize this subsector. Getting more specific on how to execute this overall strategy 
reveals much more complexity and several challenges to deployment. Economics, range 
and charging, model availability, awareness and attitudes, and lifecycle emissions will all 
need to be taken into account in developing a comprehensive and effective policy strategy. 
Because most of the deployment so far has been of plug-in vehicles rather than fuel cells, 
most of this strategy focuses on these vehicles.
To accelerate the transition to EVs, supportive policy is needed. The first challenge is 
economics. EVs are currently more expensive to buy than gasoline and diesel vehicles, 
due mainly to battery costs.¹⁶ However the mean price differential between electric and 
conventional cars has decreased dramatically in recent years. This is because costs for 
batteries have dropped by more than 80 percent since 2010. Still EV driving range (and 
battery size) has grown, the purchase price of EVs has remained higher than conventional 
vehicles. But within a few years, the total cost of ownership for an EV over its life will tend 
to become lower than for a conventional vehicle because maintenance is less, due to fewer 
moving parts, and electricity is generally less costly than the gasoline it replaces. While 
there were early concerns that batteries would require regular replacement, modern 
batteries in most applications seem to perform well for over 100,000 miles, with further 
advances suggesting even longer lives.
1995. APPROACHES FOR KEY SECTORS
While EVs will soon be cost competitive in total costs, the reality is that consumers tend to 
weigh the initial purchase price of the vehicle more heavily than future maintenance and 
energy cost savings and thus incentives will be needed for some time, though the need for 
policy intervention should diminish over time as battery costs continue to drop. 
A second challenge is range and charging time. Here is a tradeoff between cost and 
range, because the simplest way to extend the range of the vehicle is to add a bigger (and 
therefore more expensive) battery. Ranges of available EVs have increased steadily, with all 
new models having more than 200 miles of range and some market leaders having more 
than 400 miles on a single charge. While this is sufficient range for the vast majority of 
daily travel—since the average car travel per day is less than 40 miles—consumers often 
consider their most unusual use case when buying a vehicle and so expect a vehicle with 
long range, fast charging, or a combination of both.¹⁷ This range anxiety issue is addressed 
in part by providing more fast chargers.
A third challenge is availability of a diverse set of vehicle models. Consumers have come 
to expect a wide variety of vehicle sizes, shapes and performance, including number of 
seats, cargo capacity, 4-wheel drive, and power. They want compact or large sedans, small 
or large pickups with perhaps two rows of seats, minivans with more seats and doors, and 
SUVs of various shapes and sizes, with different expectations of power, luxury, and style. 
Over time, a greater variety of EVs will be made available, but for many years, the choice 
will be much more limited than for conventional vehicles. 
A fourth challenge is awareness and perception. Even as sales have increased and a 
greater diversity of models have become available, general awareness of EVs remains 
low.¹⁸ Most Americans cannot name a single EV even though more than 50 are now 
available for sale. Car dealerships often have little to no experience with EVs, and studies 
of dealers show that many dealers attempt to dissuade potential EV buyers and sell them a 
conventional vehicle instead. There are also groups of potential buyers who have negative 
attitudes towards EVs, which may prove challenging to change. On the other hand, people 
with familiarity with EVs—those who own or have driven them—tend to have positive 
impressions.
Fifth is social equity and justice. Low income communities, often suffering higher levels 
of pollution, would benefit from EVs. However, early adopters of EVs have been wealthier, 
and have benefited from the zero or low emissions of EVs. This pattern is reinforced by 
more affluent people tending to live in single-family homes where they can easily install 
home chargers, whereas lower income residents tend to live in multi-family housing and 
use off-street parking, where charging is more difficult. Public policy should encourage 
increasing equity in EV ownership as a key goal.
One fact, sometimes questioned, is the net GHG impact of electric vehicles. In virtually 
all circumstances for all EVs, the lifecycle emissions of EVs, including manufacturing, 
charging, and disposal, will be significantly less than for conventional vehicles.¹⁹ As 
electricity generation and industrial processes transition to lower emissions, the gap will 
grow. Setting policies with the lifecycle in mind can accelerate the greening of electric 
vehicles.
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Figure 5.2.4. Life cycle GHG emissions from vehicle production and operation (Kendall et al., 2019). While 
many factors affect the relative emissions of battery vs. conventional vehicles, under current real world 
conditions, EVs are much lower emissions. These emissions will decrease as the grid and industrial emissions 
are reduced.
Policies
While EVs are environmentally superior, and will soon be economically superior, EV 
market shares will be limited unless the challenges above are addressed. The key elements 
of policy should include 1) long-term binding rules requiring or motivating automakers 
to electrify their vehicles; 2) incentives for buyers in the near- and mid-term that improve 
equity; 3) public investment in charging infrastructure, with a focus on multi-family 
dwellings and public charging; 4) increased outreach, education, and engagement; and 5) 
local leadership by cities and regions in support of these aforementioned policies.
EV sales mandates are the single most important policy for decarbonizing transportation. 
California and nine additional states have a ZEV mandate, which requires automakers 
to sell an increasing portion of EVs. This mechanism provides a long-term policy signal 
to manufacturers that they will need to invest in EV development to be competitive in 
these markets. It also sends a transparent, unequivocal signal to the entire ecosystem of 
organizations and companies that need to support this transition, including automotive 
suppliers, dealers, charging companies, electric utilities, public utility commissions, local 
governments, employers, and more. The current version of the ZEV mandate, adopted 
by the 10 states, is expected to lead to approximately 10 percent of sales of LDVs in those 
states being electric by 2025.²⁰ The mandate will need to be sharply ratcheted up after 
2025 if there is to be any hope of deep decarbonization of transportation in the next few 
decades. 
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A complementary policy will be the use of greenhouse gas and/or fuel economy 
performance standards for new vehicles. To accelerate on-going improvements in gasoline 
and diesel vehicles, these standards will need to be tightened at least 5 percent per year 
in MPG terms. If tightened even faster, as is happening in Europe, a ZEV mandate might 
not be needed, since automakers would accelerate their commitment to EVs as a way of 
meeting these fuel economy/CO₂ performance standards. One advantage of standards is 
that they could in principle be developed to account for the full lifecycle of the vehicle, 
encouraging more efficient manufacturing and reuse or recycling as a component of 
compliance.
Mandates, standards, or a combination should be affirmed in statute to provide policy 
certainty to automakers. The fact that all other major car markets in the world—
China, Europe, Japan, and Korea—have adopted aggressive vehicle fuel economy and 
electrification policies provides additional market and policy certainty to automakers. 
Clean vehicle purchase incentives are a second complementary policy. Incentives are 
needed to overcome the higher purchase price of EVs in the near term, and the continuing 
reluctance and resistance of consumers, which may persist for many years, perhaps 
decades. These incentives could be in the form of rebates, feebates (a revenue-neutral 
rebate for EVs paid for by a fee on high GHG emitting vehicles), tax credits, or reduced 
registration fees. In the U.S., many states have had incentives for purchasers of EVs, in 
addition to the federal tax credit of up to $7,500. Many European countries are providing 
even larger incentives. Such incentives are highly influential in purchase decisions.²¹ 
Incentives for new vehicles should be limited to either lower income households or 
subject to a vehicle price cap. High income buyers are less influenced by incentives; these 
restrictions are effective at improving the equity effects of incentives. Since about two-
thirds of all vehicle purchases are used vehicles, usually by lower income households, 
opportunities to apply incentives to used vehicles should be given high priority.
The costs of funding vehicle purchase incentives need not be imposed on taxpayers. Since 
subsidies will continue to be needed as the market expands, expanding the magnitude 
of needed incentives, revenue source creativity is a necessity. For instance, rebates can 
be included as part of feebate programs, whereby fees would be placed on purchases 
of bigger, higher fuel-use, and more expensive vehicles. Relatively small fees on these 
vehicles could, in aggregate, pay for fairly large rebates, at least until the clean vehicle 
market grows to a sizable share of the total new vehicle market. These feebates can be 
based on sales taxes or registration fees. Another mechanism is to use revenues from 
carbon taxes or cap and trade programs to pay for incentives. And still another non-
taxpayer mechanism is to package credits generated from sales of electricity to households 
within a transportation low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS) program, as California is doing. 
In this case, oil companies are buying credits from electric utilities, in effect creating a 
subsidy from the oil industry for electric vehicles. 
Charging and hydrogen infrastructure support is a third complementary policy. The 
vast majority of EV charging today occurs at home and at work. Public charging is still 
important, however, in enabling long-distance trips, providing an occasional emergency 
charge, and increasing consumer confidence. Public charging will be a mix of medium-
power ‘level 2 charging’, well-suited to situations where vehicles are stationary for 
extended times, such as at workplaces, shopping malls, overnight at multi-family 
dwellings. There is no widely accepted single method for estimating the number of needed 
chargers for a fleet of EVs. EV infrastructure demand depends heavily on the specific 
geography, fleet mix, and vehicle-use patterns of the scenario in question.
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However, one recent analysis from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
–based on another NREL report by Wood (2017) –suggests that “on average 0.57 DCFC 
stations (and 1.85 plugs) and 40 non-residential L2 plugs per thousand [plug-in electric 
vehicles] (PEVs) [are] needed to provide minimum coverage requirements”.²² This implies 
that 15,000 DCFC plugs and 320,000 L2 plugs would be needed to support a fleet of 8 
million EVs by 2025 (the amount forecast by the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Annual 
Energy Outlook 2019). This represents approximately five times the number of plugs 
available in the United States today.
Faster charging is needed to support taxis, work vehicles, ride-hailing vehicles and long-
distance trips. The revenue from electricity sales rarely covers costs, and thus support 
from electric utilities, employers, and others is needed. In the early years, support is also 
needed for hydrogen stations, until utilization of stations increases. Hydrogen stations can 
become profitable more quickly since the energy throughput is faster and larger. 
Outreach and awareness: Private companies will, in the long run, need to advertise and 
sell EVs. In the early market, however, there may be a public role in increasing awareness 
of the benefits and availability of EVs in general. Outreach and partnership with dealers 
can also improve their awareness of the benefits of EVs.
Local policy: Although the focus of this is federal policy options, many local actions can 
support the transition to EVs. Several U.S. cities, including Austin, TX, Los Angeles, CA, 
and Seattle, WA have signed the “Green and Healthy Streets” declaration are moving to 
adopt zero emission areas, which allow access only to clean transportation modes such as 
walking, bicycling, transit, and EVs. Other cities and regions allow free or discounted use 
of priorities lanes and other forms of preferential access.
Summary Policy Recommendation for LDVs:
We recommend a foundational policy of a national LDV ZEV mandate at a minimum of 30 
percent by 2030 and 100 percent by 2040. This will provide the long-term policy certainty 
to allow the automotive industry to invest in EV development with confidence.
This policy should be supported by a suite of other policies, including:
• Incentives as a subsidy or feebate that phases out over time, for example as EVs pass 
10 percent of a particular vehicle market segment. Include an incentive for used EVs, 
avoiding potential for gaming the system through multiple resales.
• Increase Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)/GHG standards to keep pace with the 
ZEV mandate and also increase the efficiency of conventional vehicles as a transitional 
emissions reduction option
• Invest in charging infrastructure through federal investments
• Government fleet EV purchase requirements to demonstrate buy in
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5.2.5 Medium and Heavy Duty Truck Technology 
While most attention to vehicle electrification has been focused on light-duty vehicles, 
trucks are increasingly seen as appropriate for using the same technologies. There are 
many different types of trucks, notably varying in terms of overall weight, driving patterns, 
and daily driving distances. Given the relatively high efficiency of battery electric vehicles 
in an urban cycle, most medium duty urban trucks (such as delivery vans and even larger 
trucks up to class 6), are good candidates for electrification with savings on both operating 
and energy costs, and short payback times for initial higher cost vehicle investments. 
These higher costs are also dropping, along with the on-going reductions in battery costs, 
and many truck types should reach purchase cost parity with diesel trucks within the next 
10 years, and have overall “total cost of operation” that is significantly lower.²³
The bigger challenge is with very heavy (class 7 and 8) trucks, both for long haul and 
urban “day truck” use. These trucks would need large battery packs to move the heavy 
loads they typically carry (up to 30 tons of payload). Various studies suggest that it will be 
possible and even cost effective to run such trucks on batteries up to at least 200 miles 
per day, especially if their operation allows for some periods of recharge during the 
day.²⁴ The use of such trucks in long haul operation (e.g., up to 500 miles or more per 
day) becomes increasingly problematic without significant periods of recharge or use of 
ultra-fast charging, such as using one megawatt (or greater) charging power levels, which 
will be expensive and create energy/power issues for grid power systems. Since trucks 
traveling such long distances account for a high share of overall trucking fuel use, this is 
an important issue.
For such long haul trucks, as well as other types of vehicles with long range requirements, 
fuel cells are expected to be an attractive option, given their potential for much longer 
range driving per refueling, and much faster refueling. However these trucks are currently 
expensive, as is the retail cost of hydrogen (such as is used for light duty vehicles in 
California). It is widely estimated that the cost of fuel cell trucks will continue to decline to 
where, at high volumes, they will be competitive with diesel trucks in the 2030-2035 time 
frame; the bigger question is the cost of hydrogen. In theory, use of electrolytic hydrogen 
from renewable power generation could eventually provide very low production costs, 
with a final retail price of hydrogen dropping to as low as $5/kg, compared to typical prices 
of $15/kg today.
At $5/kg (about equivalent on an energy basis to $5/gallon gasoline), and with the efficiency 
advantage of fuel cells, fuel cost per mile could eventually be competitive with diesel or 
gasoline fuel. But this also is unlikely to be achieved before 2030. More RDD&D and much 
investment is needed to reduce the costs and improve the efficiency of fuel cells, hydrogen 
storage tanks, and electrolytic (green) hydrogen production—similar to what happened 
with batteries over the past decade. Policies that accelerate the commercialization of fuel 
cell vehicles will play a large role in inducing the needed investments. 
Finally, an important low-carbon fuel strategy for existing gasoline and diesel trucks is 
advanced biofuels and synthetic liquid fuels. It is feasible that either advanced biofuels, 
with truly low-carbon life cycle emissions, or fuels created from electricity (via production 
of synthesis gases and then long-chain hydrocarbons as “drop in” fuels), can provide 
essentially net-zero GHG emissions operation. However, in the case of biofuels, the 
challenge is scaling up technologies that allow production from biomass such as grasses, 
other cellulosic materials, and algae, and moving away from starches and oil-seed crops 
that do not perform as well from either a carbon nor general environmental impact 
perspective.
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Determining the quantities of any biofuels that can be produced sustainability is an 
additional challenge, suggesting that any biofuel used in transportation be allocated to 
their most valuable applications (including aviation). 
In the case of electro fuels, a pathway from electricity to liquid fuels, building molecules 
with CO₂ captured from exhaust gases or the atmosphere, can provide zero emissions, but 
the issue is cost. Currently these technologies can cost on the order of $10/gallon or more 
to produce; eventually, at large scale and with learning, and done in certain locations, it is 
believed this cost could come down to below $5. But even then, unlike an equivalent price 
for hydrogen, there is no vehicle efficiency benefit from these fuels and the fuel cost would 
thus be significantly higher than for hydrogen.
There are a range of changes that could be considered in our freight systems that could be 
coupled with the technology solutions, and some that would help enable these solutions. 
For example, some freight truck systems could be restructured to facilitate use of (shorter 
range) battery-powered trucks—such as relocating distribution centers closer to final 
destinations, using more, smaller trucks on shorter routes, and shifting some delivery 
to micro-systems such as e-bikes or even drones. Achieving an overall electric urban 
freight system should not require trucks that can travel more than 100 miles per day, and 
system adjustments to allow this should be possible—the challenge as always will be to 
reconfigure systems in a cost-effective manner.
For long haul shipments, there is a long, on-going discussion of moving more freight 
to rail, where it is viable and cost effective. Rail is already a major mover of bulk raw 
materials around the country, though shipments of coal have declined substantially in 
the past 10 years, possibly increasing capacity for other goods. One challenge in the U.S. 
is the shift in recent years to “just in time” delivery, which reduces the attractiveness of 
(more circuitous and slower) rail systems. Still, moving entire containers from trucks 
onto rail, and back to trucks again is common and probably could be expanded if pricing 
systems incentivized this. Most studies suggest that the effects of such policies might be 
small without strong price signals, which may be problematic for other reasons but is 
worth exploring. Finally, if rail is to take on a greater role and provide substantial GHG 
reductions over trucks, rail would need to be fully decarbonized, which means either 
widespread catenary systems or shifting to fuel cell locomotives, neither of which is 
currently being widely pursued. If trucks achieve very low CO₂ emissions by transitioning 
to electric propulsion and low-carbon biofuels, then the advantages of switching freight to 
rail mostly dissipates. 
5.2.6 Intercity Passenger Travel: Aviation, Coach, Rail and 
Personal Vehicles 
While decarbonization of daily travel within communities and metropolitan areas 
is critically important, approximately 30 percent of the passenger miles of travel in 
the United States are estimated to be long-distance or intercity.²⁵ Intercity, including 
international, travel is undertaken by personal vehicle, motor coach, rail, and aviation. 
Long-distance travel, both personal and business, was projected to significantly increase 
before the COVID-19 pandemic and may again as growth is driven by disposable income, 
the large global tourism industry, wide-spread social networks, and globally dispersed 
manufacturing and business operations. Aviation and rail account for 9 percent and 2 
percent of transportation emissions in the U.S.²⁶
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Much of the future growth in passenger aviation was projected for international travel, 
requiring coordinated policy actions. The US Department of Commerce estimates that 
only about 15 percent of international trips were for business purposes, which suggests 
lingering COVID-19 impacts on business travel might not have significant effects on GHG 
emissions.²⁷
The length of intercity trips and shipments vary significantly. Policy solutions vary by 
distance range and here we focus on passenger travel on “intra-regional” as less than 
400 miles one-way and “inter-regional” as greater than 400-miles one-way. Note that in 
many cases “inter-regional” trips are 1000s of miles or even intercontinental in length. 
Ultimately, different modes incur different levels of energy and embody different 
efficiencies per passenger mile but ultimately trip length and how full the vehicle is. The 
longer the trip the more energy and thus emissions and therefore the vehicles should be 
operating with as close to capacity of passengers as possible.
Significant replacement of liquid petroleum-derived jetfuel upon which the inter-regional 
trips rely will be a challenge due to energy density. Airplanes have steadily improved 
efficiency since the 1970s, reducing energy use per passenger mile by 3 percent per year 
since 1970, and 2.6 percent annually since 2007.²⁸ Through 2050, researchers expect 
a net improvement of 2 percent per year in energy per passenger mile but most of 
this improvement is attributable to fleet turnover and operational improvements not 
merely aircraft design. Sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) or bio-jet is being tested in several 
markets but the generation of the quantities needed for complete, or even substantial, 
substitution is not feasible with expected fuel stocks. Policies to incentivize reasonable 
levels of SAF for use in flight for trips over 400-miles is recommended. This effort should 
include an international low-carbon jet fuel standard. For interregional long-distance 
travel above 400-miles (or travel across water, to Hawaii for example) airlines have little 
modal competition and there are no time-effective alternatives. In this range, reducing 
travel demand (or holding it constant without growth) through significant increased ticket 
fees and allocation of these resources based on efficiency-based metrics to airlines and 
airports is a viable policy option. Given that flying is needed for national and international 
communities and economies, the decarbonization solution for long-haul passenger 
aviation (>400-miles) is based on the assumption that these aircraft will remain legacy 
users of petroleum. Although the policy goal should be reducing short-haul segments 
(<400-miles) even when the overall trip is longer, in total we must aim to hold passenger 
flight miles constant at pre-COVID-19 levels. Note as well some shorter flights in places 
without alternatives will remain such as for Alaska, Puerto Rico and Hawaii, especially for 
freight. Fees on international arrivals may be a reasonable way to raise revenue for green 
airport infrastructure. 
Miles flown on petroleum fuel for trip lengths or segment lengths less than 400 miles 
must be minimized if not completely eliminated. This goal can be accomplished through 
a combination of investment in alternative modes, reduction of travel demand and both 
electric flight and electric surface vehicles. This diversion of inter-regional travel from air 
to surface will require fees of a substantial level and incentives for development of higher 
passenger capacity for reasonable range electric flight. In the 120 to 400 mile range there 
must also be incentives and infrastructure investment where demand is high for reliable 
rail service and electric coach service. Travelers should be encouraged to use flying for 
trips where efficient surface alternatives are not viable. 
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The needed modal substitution in intercity travel will include switches from airlines to 
automated electric coaches and vans.²⁹ Incentivizing multi-person commercial vehicle 
services, including motor coaches, will be critical especially in congested corridors. To 
achieve decarbonization, long-distance automated vehicle travel must be via electric 
vehicles. 
While high-speed rail, similar to what is available in other countries is desirable, there are 
other lower cost solutions that can improve rail service. Selective upgrading of current 
infrastructure that allow higher average speeds (above 120 mph) and more reliable 
speeds can be beneficial in high volume corridors. Exploration of more effective high 
capacity rail or coach service potentially along interstate highway corridors with airports 
as multimodal mobility hubs is advisable. In short, policies to discourage short-haul 
flights, even those that are part of longer trips, will be necessary replacing these with 
electric ground transportation that is better integrated with air scheduling. Finally, trips 
generally under 120 miles should most often be ground-based and can be converted to EVs 
but require regional coordination to ensure access to those who may be transit-captive 
especially in rural areas. There will be a need to develop more efficient ground-based 
services for essential air service routes. 
There is the need for an expanded role of the USDOT and Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) in national mobility and infrastructure system planning for long-distance travel. The 
aviation system operates on a large geographic scale within which only the USDOT has 
jurisdiction for coordinated system-wide planning. An optimized national aviation system 
(including the expanded use of electric ground equipment, flight path optimization to 
reduce emissions, increased renewable energy generation at airports, use of underutilized 
airports to reduce induced driving and reduce infrastructure investment and coordination 
of surface mode connections including rival heavy and light rail systems) requires data, 
modeling and strong vision-based decision-making. Airlines and private actors should be 
expected to optimize for their own system, but they require strong national public policy 
and robust international agreements to set system-wide objectives and operating rules. 
Federal policy, largely driven by funding, should be balanced between modes to provide 
the best solutions. Currently aviation funding is separate from ground transportation 
funding, leading to non-optimal investment decisions. There should be one unified 
transportation trust fund, instead of one for highways and one for aviation. 
In general, airport infrastructure expansion should be limited with an emphasis on 
improving the environmental performance of existing airports and using existing capacity. 
Moreover, national travel data and a demand forecasting model is needed to guide a 
potential re-alignment of the hub and spoke routing patterns which may be resulting in 
more passenger air miles than required to meet actual passenger origins and destinations.
In short, for intercity travel (including any part of a trip) under 400-miles, modal 
substitution to electric surface vehicles is necessary. In rural areas, this will include 
electric motor coaches and in urban corridors rail, light rail, and motor coaches. Policies 
to accelerate conversion to these systems will be needed. For travel or segments over 
400-miles in length, shorter legs must be eliminated and ground transportation and total 
passenger miles flown must be held constant powered by liquid petroleum fuel and where 
feasible limited biofuel stocks encouraged by international low-carbon fuel standards. 
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5.2.7 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
To reduce GHG emissions in the transport sector, one strategic initiative stands out: the 
transition from combustion engines to electric propulsion for virtually all cars, trucks, 
and buses and a limited number of airplanes—including the use of battery, plug-in hybrid, 
and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles. But even in this transition to electric propulsion, 
a suite of policies is needed, including aggressive GHG vehicle performance standards, 
vehicle sales requirements, incentives for vehicle purchase (especially during the next 
decade), and incentives and subsidies for public charging and hydrogen stations.
The cost of this transition will be relatively modest in the context of our massive 
expenditures for vehicles and fuels. Indeed, in most vehicle segments electric vehicles will 
eventually be less expensive in terms of total cost of ownership—eventually generating 
large cost savings to the economy and society. If one adds reductions in external costs, 
especially health and climate, then the savings to society become quite large.³⁰
The second most important strategy is reduction in vehicle use and filling vehicles to 
passenger capacity, but with an understanding that greater accessibility is desired for 
mobility disadvantaged groups such as those with low incomes, those with mobility 
disadvantages, and elderly travelers. In simple terms, this means improving services 
that carry more passengers and discourage those that serve single occupants or drivers, 
including zero occupants (as could be the case with automated vehicles). The types of 
services to be incentivized include conventional buses and rail, pooled ride-hailing 
services, and bicycles, e-bikes, and e-scooters. Reducing VMT and improving accessibility 
for mobility disadvantaged travelers is especially challenging, but the number of co-
benefits is large, including cleaner air, improved public health, less land for parking and 
roads, lower road infrastructure costs, and more equitable access to jobs, school, health 
services, recreation, and more. 
Overall, the top priority policies to reduce emissions from the transport sector are the 
following:
• Make ZEVs a high share of vehicles
• National ZEV sales requirements for cars as described in chapter 4: 
 › National LDV ZEV mandate at a minimum of 30 percent of new sales by 2030 and 100 
percent of new sales by 2040.
 › National medium duty vehicle (MDV) and HDV ZEV mandate at a minimum of 20 
percent of new sales by 2030 and 80 percent of new sales by 2050.
• National ZEV sales and fleet purchase requirements for trucks
• Incentives for ZEV vehicle purchases and support for investments in needed ZEV 
infrastructure 
• Tightened fuel economy/GHG standards for all new cars and trucks
• Low-carbon fuel standards covering all fuels for road vehicles and airplanes
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• Reduce passenger travel and vehicle dependence—while increasing access for walking, 
bicycling, new micro mobility modes, telecommunications, transit, pooled ride-hailing 
services, and other low-carbon choices, especially for disadvantaged travelers, via:
 › Altering distribution of funds from the federal transportation trust fund and stimulus 
packages away from new highway capacity and lane expansions, and toward bicycle, 
pedestrian and new micro mobility modes infrastructure; transit in dense areas; and 
public-private partnerships between transit operators and ride-hailing providers. 
 › Supporting local and state actions to increase low-carbon travel and investments, 
reduce single-occupant vehicle use, and support transit-oriented development. 
 › Pricing policies that create incentives and generate funds for investments in low-
carbon alternatives
Other priorities include investment in and support of low-carbon biofuels for aviation, 
ships, and long haul trucks, and the use of automation for electric, pooled vehicles. 
Automated vehicles (AVs) are desired, from an environmental (as well as an economic 
and equity) perspective, only if they are used in commercial mobility services that feature 
pooled services (versus single passengers)—and not individually owned. If individually 
owned they will likely lead to large increases in VMT, largely offsetting emission 
reductions from electrification. When used in commercial pooled services, this new 
technology provides the opportunity to reduce vehicle use, provide low-cost accessibility 
to mobility disadvantaged travelers, reduce the cost of travel to individuals and society, and 
sharply reduce the amount of land devoted to transportation. 
Transportation is generally seen as the most challenging sector to decarbonize, but it 
may also prove one of the least costly—even eventually providing large economic saving. 
It is also the sector with the greatest opportunity to provide a large number of associated 
co-benefits to travelers and society and to create a more environmentally sustainable and 
equitable society.
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